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Perspectives on Intellectual Property
A Personal Injury Law Perspective on
Copyright in an Internet Age
by
ALFRED C. YEN*
A recurring theme in modem copyright law is the notion that
Internet technology unacceptably threatens the security of copyrights.
The difficulty of policing millions of Internet users who can share files
at the click of a button' means that copyright holders have no easy
way to control or ensure payment for unauthorized uses of their
works.2  Those with major commercial interests in content,
particularly the entertainment and software industries,
understandably fear a potential loss in profits or even the end of their
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Boston College Law
School.
1. For descriptions of the Internet and its operation, see Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849-51 (1997), Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1995), PRESTON GRALLA,
How THE INTERNET WORKS 5-7 (Millenium ed. 1999), DANIEL J. KURLAND, THE 'NET,
THE WEB, AND You 25-29 (1996), DAVE SPERLING, DAVE SPERLING'S INTERNET
GUIDE 2-3 (2d ed. 1998).
2. Title 17 of the United States Code reserves to copyright holders a number of
exclusive rights, including the right to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted work. 17
U.S.C. § 106(4)-(6) (Supp. IV 1998). These rights, however, are not absolute, as copyright
deliberately circumscribes the rights of copyright holders. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994)
(denying copyright to ideas); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (codifying the fair use doctrine);
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879) (denying the author of a book an exclusive
property in processes or methods described therein); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (extending fair use to permit limited recording of on-air
televsion programming); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
(applying fair use doctrine to parodies); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119
(2d Cir. 1930) (holding that playwright acquires no property right in his ideas by virtue of
copyright). This means that unauthorized uses of copyrighted works are not necessarily
infringements of copyright. Nevertheless, the Internet permits its users to commit




financial viability. ,Accordingly, these so-called "content providers"
have taken steps to secure their interests.
A significant component of the content providers' strategy is the
claim that responsibility for copyright infringement on the Internet
extends beyond the users who directly commit infringement to those
who provide Internet technology. Copyright holders have already
argued (with mixed success) that Internet service providers ("ISPs")
are liable for copyright infringement committed by their users
Copyright owners have also successfully asserted that other providers
of Internet technology are liable for infringement committed by their
users of that technology. The most famous of these cases is the
recording industry's claim that Napster, Inc. is both vicariously and
contributorily liable for its users' unauthorized sharing of music files.4
Copyright owners have also successfully pursued legislative
solutions. The recently enacted Digital Millenium Copyright Act
("DMCA") 5 contains a number of provisions designed to assist
copyright owners' use of technology to prevent unauthorized access
to or reproduction of works. Among other things, the DMCA
outlaws the distribution or use of technological devices that
circumvent encryption or other technological measures that restrict
access to works, even if the works in question are not protected by
copyright or the use being made is noninfringing.6 These provisions
have allowed content providers to gain injunctive relief against those
posting Internet links that facilitate access to circumvention
technology.7
Not suprisingly, these developments are controversial. Providers
of Internet technology argue that they should not be held responsible
for the behavior of others. Likewise, consumers of copyrighted works
complain that these developments deprive them of access to works
3. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d), (f), (g), (i) (regulating but not eliminating the
possibility of ISP liability for user infringement); Marobie-FL Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire
Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (generally following the Netcom
analysis); Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66 (denying plaintiff's claim for vicarious liability
at summary judgment but refusing to deny plaintiffs claim for contributory infringement).
For a detailed analysis of the relevant statutory and case law, see Alfred C. Yen, Internet
Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and
the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833 (2000).
4. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., No. 00-16401 (9th Cir. Apr. 3, 2001) (affirming
preliminary injunction against operators of music file sharing directory upon finding of
vicarious and contributory liability); see also ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmties., Inc., 239
F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001) (reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant, which
offered Internet access to newsgroups containing infringing material, on the issue of
whether plaintiff was barred from asserting a claim of contributory copyright
infringement).
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201 (Supp. IV 1998).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 1998).
7. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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presently guaranteed by the copyright law. Copyright holders reply
that these measures are necessary to protect copyrights. Anything
less, they contend, represents a fundamental neglect of property
rights.
This Essay offers perspective on this debate by comparing recent
efforts to prevent copyright infringement with similar efforts to
prevent personal injury in tort law. Although the length of this Essay
precludes comprehensive treatment of the issues that will be raised, it
is hoped that its ideas will stimulate thinking and debate about the
lengths to which society should go to ensure the security of
copyrights. As will be described below, many recent efforts to protect
copyrights bear considerable resemblance to the use of enterprise
liability in tort and gun control measures. This correspondence is
worth studying because the social balances struck in tort law and gun
control have required intense litigation and social debate. The
resulting compromises therefore represent a rough social consensus
about how far we are willing to go to protect individuals from serious
harm. If the measures desired by copyright holders seem consistent
with the limits of personal injury law or gun control measures, then
perhaps they do reflect our society's general values. However, if
those measures seem more drastic than those we are willing to accept
when guarding against serious physical injury or death, then perhaps
recent efforts to expand copyright protection have gone too far.
I. Copyright, Enterprise Liability, and Gun Control
The claim that Internet technology providers are liable for
infringement committed by users resembles the application of
enterprise liability in tort law. Just as manufacturers of defective
products must internalize the losses caused by their products,
enterprises like Napster or ISPs must internalize the costs of
copyright infringement caused by Internet technology. Such
internalization forces enterprises to take precautions against losses
and spread losses among their customers. Copyright holders
undoubtedly hope that the use of enterprise liability will force
enterprises like ISPs or Napster to stop unauthorized use of
copyrighted works or collect licensing fees from users to pay for
damages.
Polygram International Publishing v. Nevada/TIG8 offers clear
evidence of the connection between copyright and tort law. That
case, which has been cited to support liability against Internet
8. 855 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Mass. 1994).
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technology providers, 9 involved the claim that the organizers of a
trade show were liable for unauthorized use of copyrighted music by
exhibitors at the show. In finding for the plaintiffs, the court wrote:
When an individual seeks to profit from an enterprise in which
identifiable types of losses are expected to occur, it is ordinarily fair
and reasonable to place responsibility for those losses on the person
who profits, even if that person makes arrangements for others to
perform the acts that foreseeably cause the losses. The law of
vicarious liability treats the expected losses as simply another cost
of doing business. The enterprise and the person profiting from it
are better able than either the innocent injured plaintiff or the
person whose act caused the loss to distribute the costs and to shift
them to others who have profited from the enterprise. In addition,
placing responsibility for the loss on the enterprise has the added
benefit of creating a greater incentive for the enterprise to police its
operations carefully to avoid unnecessary losses.
10
A correspondence between copyright and personal injury also
arises when one compares restrictions on technology to gun control.
Just as some argue that guns must be made unavailable because they
pose an unacceptable risk to human safety, copyright holders are
claiming that certain technology must be made unavailable because it
creates an unacceptable risk of copyright infringement.
H. Some Observations About Enterprise Liability and Gun
Control
The application of enterprise liability and gun control concepts in
copyright is quite plausible. The objectives of copyright and personal
injury law bear some degree of undeniable resemblance. However,
before the results urged in copyright can be fully accepted, some
observations need to be made.
First, the use of enterprise liability in tort law developed from a
concern about physical injury to humans. Early writers about
enterprise liability in tort specifically cited human injury, and not
generalized economic harm, as the justification for expanding the
scope of tort liability.1 This concern for personal injury still affects
tort doctrine to this day. For example, the so-called "economic loss
9. See Napster, No. 00-16401 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1325-
26); see also Brief for Plaintiffs/Appellees at 36, 43, A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., Nos.
00-16401 and 00-16403 (9th Cir. Oct. 2,2000).
10. Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1325.
11. For example, Fleming James spoke of injury to persons (and not all injuries) when
making his early and influential case in favor of strict products liability: "Strict liability is
to be preferred over a system of liability based on fault wherever you have an enterprise
or activity, beneficial to many, which takes a more or less inevitable accident toll of human
life and limb." Fleming James Jr., General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable
Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REv. 923,923 (1957).
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rule" permits recovery for economic loss only when the defendant has
also caused physical injury to humans or property.12 Similar limits on
recovery exist in the law of vicarious liability, particularly the
exceptions to the independent contractor defense. 13 These doctrines
are consistent with our general social intuition that personal safety is
generally more important than harm to property or economic
interests.
14
Second, the fact that liability against a defendant will spread loss
and create incentives to avoid injury has never, in and of itself, been
considered sufficient to create that liability. If such loss spreading
and avoidance were enough, there would be no limit to the reach of
enterprise liability. Everyone associated with a product would
become liable because everyone could spread loss or take
precaution.15  Accordingly, tort law uses doctrines of defect,
proximate cause, and assumption of risk to limit the reach of
enterprise liability in various situations, including those that involve
third party misuse of products. 16 These doctrines explain, at least in
part, why it is almost impossible for plaintiffs to recover against gun
manufacturers or liquor manufacturers for personal injury caused by
the use of their products even though such liability would spread loss
and create incentives for safety.17 Moreover, these doctrines embody
12. See Hou-Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics, 26 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App. 2000)
(applying the doctrine to prevent recovery against defendant software maker when bugs in
software caused economic loss); Rissler & McMurry v. Sheridan Area Water Supply Joint
Powers Bd., 929 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Wyo. 1996) ("The 'economic loss rule' bars recovery in
tort when a plaintiff claims purely economic damages unaccompanied by physical injury to
person or property."); Fishbein v. Corel Corp., 29 Pa. D. & C. 4th 289 (1996) (applying the
economic loss rule to bar class action against defendant software manufacturer for costs of
overcoming or correcting bug in software).
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 416-417, 423, 425, 427, 427A-B, 428
(using the term "physical harm" and not "harm" in applying the independent contractor
defense).
14. See Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Iowa 1971) (holding property owner
liable for using deadly force to protect property absent a threat of death or serious bodily
harm). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 85 cmt. a (1965) states:
The value of human life and limb, not only to the individual concerned but also
to society, so outweighs the interest of a possessor of land in excluding from it
those whom he is not willing to admit, that a possessor of land has, as is stated in
§ 79, no privilege to use force intended or likely to cause death or serious harm
against another whom the possessor sees about to enter his premises or meddle
with his chattel, unless the intrusion threatens death or serious bodily harm to the
occupiers or users of the premises.
15. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of
the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 527 (1985)
("The unavoidable implication of the three presuppositions of manufacturer power,
manufacturer insurance, and internalization is absolute liability.").
16. See Yen, supra note 3, at 1857.
17. Id. at 1859-62.
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the social judgment that sole responsibility for misuse rests with the
individual committing the misuse and not the entity providing the
guns or alcohol.
Finally, it must be noted that our society has not in fact enacted
legislation that bans the possession of guns-even the so-called
"Saturday Night Specials" frequently used in the commision of crime.
This observation is important because handguns impose huge
amounts of tragic loss on society. Nevertheless, the social judgment
expressed through our political and judicial processes is that even the
terrible loss of human life is not enough to justify depriving citizens of
the legitimate uses of handguns. The argument that "guns don't kill
people, people do" reflects society's prevailing sentiment about the
possibility of making guns truly unavailable.
M. Comparing Copyright to Personal Injury
The foregoing observations about personal injury law create
some interesting implications for the expansion of copyright
protection. At the outset, one should notice that the application of
enterprise liability to products developed as a form of consumer
protection. 18 One could argue that the use of enterprise liability in
copyright turns everything upside down by protecting commercial
entities from consumers, and not vice versa. It is as if copyright
holders have been transformed into victims analogous to people
injured by defective automobiles. The use of enterprise liability to
protect copyrights seems even stranger when one recognizes that
copyright infringement inflicts intangible economic injuries, and not
the physical personal injuries that justify the use of enterprise liability
in tort law.'9
As noted earlier, plaintiffs injured by misuse of guns or alcohol
have practically no chance of recovering from gun or alcohol
manufacturers. 20 This reflects the social judgment that the losses
suffered by those plaintiffs are not sufficiently serious to extend tort
liability beyond the person committing the misuse. If we apply the
same values in copyright, it is not clear why the harm of copyright
infringement justifies the sort of extended liability deemed
inappropriate in the case of guns or alcohol. To be sure, one could
consider bodily injury and copyright infringement equally grave,21 but
18. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (influential
early products liability case in which plaintiff recovers against defendant on breach of
warranty theory).
19. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
21. In reference to the threat of copyright infringement posed by video cassette
recorders, Motion Picture Association of America President Jack Valenti has been quoted
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it is doubtful that society generally agrees with such a calibration of
values.
Finally, the same sort of question seems relevant when
considering anti-circumvention legislation. If our society does not
think that gunshot wounds justify a general prohibition against the
possession of guns, why should it deem copyrights important enough
to support a similar prohibition against certain kinds of computer
technology?2
IV. Should Copyright or Personal Injury Law Change?
A possible response to the foregoing is that tort and gun control
laws need to change. If copyright is "ahead of" these areas of law by
offering more generous protection against the misbehavior of
individuals, then perhaps tort or gun control law should itself offer
more generous protection. There is undeniable attraction to this
proposition, particularly if one is frustrated by our society's
willingness to take on gun manufacturers and other alleged
tortfeasors. However, it is not at all clear that such a change would be
desirable, even from the perspective of the entertainment and
software industries pushing for more copyright protection.
As noted earlier, if the principles of loss spreading and loss
avoidance are in and of themselves sufficient to establish enterprise
liability, it is not clear that liability for copyright infringement stops
with ISPs or Napster-like services. Manufacturers of operating
systems, CD-ROM burners, Internet browsers, and computer chips
all know that their products are used to commit copyright
infringement and are in a position to both spread loss and take
precautions. To the extent that some of these manufacturers are
copyright owners desirous of greater copyright protection,2 would
they be happy if they were also financially responsible for the
behavior of those who use their technology?
Consider what might happen if society decided to equate
intangible economic harm with bodily injury for purposes of imposing
enterprise liability. If society guards against intangible economic
injuries as fiercely as it does bodily injury, manufacturers of software
may find themselves exposed to lawsuits for economic harm.
saying that the video cassette recorder "is to the American film producer and the
American public as the Boston Strangler is to the woman alone." Adam Liptak, Is
Litigation the Best Way to Tame New Technology?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2000, at Art &
Ideas/Cultural Desk.
22. Although the scope of this Essay prevents further exploration of the possible
responses to this question, at least one possible line of inquiry is suggested infra at note 27.
23. For example, Microsoft is a leading content provider and maker of operating
systems.
April 2001]
Presently, the economic loss rule protects software manufacturers
from economic losses caused by defects in software precisely because
economic losses are considered less important than physical personal
injury.24 If that distinction disappears, those who suffer financially
because of software that they or others use may find that a significant
barrier to their recovery no longer exists.
The entertainment industry may also have similar problems
under an expanded liability regime. That industry knows that
consumers who watch television stunts or listen to violent music lyrics
sometimes imitate what they consume. For example, a teenager in
Connecticut recently suffered second and third degree burns when he
and his friends tried to duplicate a stunt from MTV in which a person
sat on a barbeque grill while having lighter fluid sprayed on his
body.25 Existing law generally bars plaintiffs in such cases from
recovery, even when the First Amendment concerns are ignored.26 If
society begins expanding liability for such injury beyond the
immediate misusers (i.e., the children themselves), the entertainment
industry might lose protection from liability that it surely values.
Conclusion
This Essay suggests that recent efforts to expand copyright
protection are inconsistent with our society's willingness to place
responsibility for misbehavior on people other than those
immediately committing the misbehavior. When one considers the
limits that exist in tort law and gun control legislation, it seems that
copyright's recent expansion may put society in the odd position of
doing more to prevent copyright infringement than personal injury.
Perhaps, then, extended liability claims against ISPs and restrictions
on certain computer technologies upset a well-accepted social balance
and should be curtailed.
This does not mean, of course, that society should not protect
copyrights. Those who acquire technology that makes copyright
infringement possible must use it responsibly or face liability. Some
vicarious or contributory copyright claims will make sense.
Nevertheless, the undesirability of overzealous enforcement is part of
copyright theory itself. Copyright's social bargain involves the
24. See Hou-Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics, 26 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App. 2000)
(applying the doctrine to prevent recovery against defendant software maker when bugs in
software caused economic loss); Fishbein v. Corel Corp., 29 Pa. D. & C. 4th 289 (1996)
(applying the economic loss rule to bar class action against defendant software
manufacturer for costs of overcoming or correcting bug in software).
25. See Teen Burned Imitating MTV Stunt, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, at
http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Jan. 29,2001).
26. See Richard C. Ausness, The Application of Product Liability Principles to
Publishers of Violent or Sexually Explicit Material, 52 FLA. L. REv. 603 (2000).
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judgment that property rights must be offset by free unpermitted
access to works. That is why doctrines like the idea/expression
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine exist. These doctrines make
copyright an insecure property right, one subject to unconsented use
by consumers. Eliminating that insecurity from the Internet upsets an
important social judgment.
To be sure, the conclusions offered here cannot be considered
final, as the space available does not permit a complete examination
of all the relevant issues. A particularly interesting topic for further
study would be the degree to which existing or potentially legitimate
uses of Internet technology govern their appropriate treatment.27
The resolution of possibilities such as these requires fairly detailed
study about the various types of products whose distribution society
restricts or whose manufacturers might be held liable for their
products', misuse. The point here is merely that we must be careful
about blithely accepting the assertion that copyrights are property,
and that we can never do enough to protect property. As of this
writing, we do not even know if copyright based industries are truly
threatened by enterprises like ISPs and Napster or circumvention
technologies.28 Society has always expressed limits on the reach of
27. This line of inquiry was first brought to the Author's attention in discussions with
members of the CyberProf listserv, with particularly helpful contributions from Eugene
Volokh, Justin Hughes, and Lydia Pallas Loren.
For example, one might argue that guns are not banned because they can be put to a
number of legitimate uses, including self-defense, target shooting, and hunting. Perhaps
then only those Internet technologies without substantial noninfringing uses should be
subject to restriction. Recent anti-circumvention legislation and case law arguably
embody this principle. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1998) (restricting
distribution of devices with "only limited commercially significant purpose or use other
than to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work");
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (refusing to apply
contributory liability against technology merely capable of substantial noninfringing use).
One might also assert, however, that society has not consistently banned nor exposed
to tort liability even those gun-related products with few legitimate uses. For example,
courts have refused to hold liable the makers of hollowpoint bullets that increase the
severity of injury by expanding upon contact with the body. See McCarthy v. Olin Corp.,
119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of complaint against manufacturer of
hollowpoint bullets designed to increase severity of injury, sold to the general public, and
used during a mass shooting of commuters). Perhaps these bullets should be left
unregulated against the contingency that a citizen would face attack by an assailant
undeterred by an ordinary bullet. Yet, if this claim were accepted, it would also seem as if
Internet technologies with fairly limited noninfringing uses should also remain relatively
unregulated, especially if one believes that preventing unwarranted gunshot wounds is
more important than preventing copyright infringement.
28. See Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet
Technology, Copyright Liability, and the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining, - U.
DAYTON L. REv. __ (forthcoming 2001) (arguing that in the long run, technology like
Napster will not destroy incentives for the production of recorded music).
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liability, and until society has more time to think about the Internet, a
cautious approach to expanding copyright protection seems wise.
